On the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Large Games by Carmona, Guilherme
On the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash
Equilibria in Large Games¤
Guilherme Carmona
Universidade Nova de Lisboa
Faculdade de Economia
Campus de Campolide, 1099-032 Lisboa, Portugal
email: gcarmona@fe.unl.pt
telephone: (351) 21 380 1671
fax: (351) 21 388 6073
April 4, 2006
¤I wish to thank M¶ ario P¶ ascoa, Myrna Wooders for very helpful comments and John
Hu®stot for editorial assistance. Any remaining errors are, of course, mine.
1Abstract
Over the years, several formalizations of games with a continuum
of players have been given. These include those of Schmeidler (1973),
Mas-Colell (1984) and Khan and Sun (1999). Unlike the others, Khan
and Sun (1999) also addressed the equilibrium problem of large ¯-
nite games, establishing the existence of a pure strategy approximate
equilibrium in su±ciently large games. This ability for their formal-
ization to yield asymptotic results led them to argue for it as the right
approach to games with a continuum of players.
We challenge this view by establishing an equivalent asymptotic
theorem based only on Mas-Colell's formalization. Furthermore, we
show that it is equivalent to Mas-Colell's existence theorem. Thus, in
contrast to Khan and Sun (1999), we conclude that Mas-Colell's for-
malization is as good as theirs for the development of the equilibrium
theory of large ¯nite games.
Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Asymptotic Results; Pure Strategies; Ap-
proximate equilibria.
21 Introduction
Nash (1950)'s celebrated existence theorem asserts that every ¯nite normal-
form game has a mixed strategy equilibrium. However, in many contexts
mixed strategies are unappealing and hard to interpret, leading naturally to
the question of the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria.
Schmeidler (1973) was successful in obtaining an answer to the above
question. He showed that in a special class of games | in which each player's
payo® depends only on his choice and on the average choice of the others |
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists in every such game with a continuum
of players.
Schmeidler's formalization parallels that of Nash in that players have a
¯nite action space, there is a function assigning to each of them a payo®
function in a measurable way and the equilibrium notion is formalized in
terms of a strategy, i.e., as a measurable function from players into actions.
The di®erence is that, while in Nash (1950) there is a ¯nite number of players
(which, in particular, makes the measurability conditions trivial), in Schmei-
dler (1973) the set of players is the unit interval endowed with the Lebesgue
measure.
Although natural, Schmeidler's formalization entails serious di±culties.
As shown by Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997), Schmeidler's theorem does not
extend to general games | in fact, one has to assume that either the action
space or the family of payo® functions is denumerable in order to guarantee
the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium (see Khan and Sun (1995) and
Carmona (2005b)).
Motivated by this, Khan and Sun (1999) reformulated the theory of non-
3atomic games by modeling the set of players as a Loeb space. This reformu-
lation allowed them to obtain an existence theorem for general games, thus
dispensing with any countability assumption. This result allowed them to
show that, with an appropriate assumption, all su±ciently large ¯nite games
have an approximate equilibrium. This major success, among others, led
them to argue for games on Loeb spaces as the right model of large games.
In this paper, we challenge this view by proving an equivalent asymptotic
theorem using neither games on Loeb spaces nor non-standard analysis (es-
sential to their results). In fact, we show that our result, and therefore, Kahn
and Sun's, is equivalent to Mas-Colell's Theorem (see Mas-Colell (1984)) on
the existence of an equilibrium distribution for non-atomic games. These
results suggest that Mas-Colell's formalization of the equilibrium theory of
large games | in which the equilibrium notion is formulated in terms of
distributions and not as a strategy | is as good as that of Khan and Sun
for the development of the asymptotic theory of large games.
The equivalence between the asymptotic existence theorem and Mas-
Colell's theorem gives us a way, at least for the existence of equilibria, to
go back and forth between an exact result for the non-atomic case and an
approximate result for the asymptotic large ¯nite case. We strengthen this
relation between the two models by characterizing the equilibrium distribu-
tions of non-atomic games in terms of approximate equilibria in large ¯nite
games. This provides a simple and direct way of relating non-atomic games
to large ¯nite games that dispenses with the use of non-standard analysis.
Although general characterizations are possible (see Carmona (2004)),
for the purpose of establishing the asymptotic existence theorem, we need
4a simple and surprisingly particular characterization result. Indeed, we can
focus on games with a continuum of players with a ¯nite action space and
with ¯nitely many characteristics belonging to an equicontinuous family. It
states that a distribution of actions » of any such game G is an equilibrium
if and only if for all sequences fGkg of ¯nite games converging to G (in
the sense that the distributions over characteristics converge), there exists
a corresponding sequence ffkg of "k { equilibria with the property that "k
converges to 0 and the sequence of distributions induced by fk converges
to ». It is then clear that any property that an equilibrium distribution
over action has, translates into a corresponding approximate version of it for
all large ¯nite games, and vice versa. Although this characterization result
holds only in the special class of games described above, we can nevertheless
use it for general games, simply by approximating any such game by games
in the special class in which the theorem holds. This is the reason why
we can use it to establish the equivalence between the asymptotic existence
theorem and Mas-Colell's theorem, which applies to general games (i.e., to
games with general compact metric spaces of actions and with characteristics
that may not be equicontinuous). Although the characterizations we develop
in Carmona (2004) apply directly to the general case, the characterization
presented here is more useful to our purpose due to the bounds on "k and
on the distance between the distributions induced by fk and », which the
special case makes possible.
The above characterization result, and those of Carmona (2004), can
be interpreted as showing that Mas-Colell's model is asymptotically imple-
mentable, a criterion defended by Khan and Sun (1999), among others. Fur-
5thermore, by construction, it also frees the theory of large games from the
homogeneity and measurability concerns1 by focusing directly on distribu-
tions.
As Aumann (1964) pointed out, large games are an idealization of large
¯nite games, and so the actual space of players has no particular signi¯-
cance. Given this, a strategy has no more signi¯cance than the distribution
it induces. As we have argued, this distribution is all we need to obtain
the existence of an approximate equilibrium in large ¯nite games. There-
fore, judging Mas-Colell's distributional formalization of large games by the
criteria emphasized by Khan and Sun (1999), it becomes very appealing.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our no-
tation and basic de¯nitions. In Section 3, we present our characterization
result. Our asymptotic result and its equivalence with Mas-Colell's theorem
are stated in Section 4. In Section 5, we establish several asymptotic results
for games with an action space endowed with a linear structure and in which
players' payo®s depend on the distribution of choices only through the av-
erage of players' choices. These results are all obtained as corollaries to our
asymptotic result. In Section 6, we allow players to choose mixed strategies
and players' payo®s to depend on the distribution of mixed strategies chosen.
We then show that an asymptotic result also holds in this setting. In Section
7, we provide two examples that show that neither can we obtain an exact
version for our asymptotic result, nor can we dispense with the equiconti-
1The homogeneity property holds when two strategies with the same distribution can
be related (by an automorphism). Regarding measurability, the concern is that requiring a
strategy to be a measurable function can be a restrictive assumption, namely by imposing
some sort of continuity on player's responses. See Khan and Sun (1999) for details.
6nuity assumption that we use. In Section 8, we present a correct version of
Khan and Sun's asymptotic theorem (we give an example showing that the
theorem fails as they have stated it), and then show that this correct version
is equivalent to our asymptotic theorem. Section 9 concludes.
2 Notation and De¯nitions
In the class of normal-form games we consider, all players have a common
pure strategy space X. We assume that X is a compact metric space. Since
the focus is on a property that depends on the number of players, we will
index any game by the number of its players. Thus, Gn is a normal-form
game in which the set of players is Tn = f1;:::;ng, and each has X as its
choice set. A strategy is then a function f : Tn ! X. Obviously, a strategy
f can also be thought of as the vector (f1;:::;fn) in Xn.
A game Gn is then speci¯ed by the vector of payo® functions, one for each
player. In this paper we will focus on a special class of games in which each
player's payo® depends on his strategy and on the distribution of strategies
chosen by the other players. Let M(X) be the set of Borel probability
measures on X endowed with the Prohorov metric ½. Given a strategy f in
a game with n players, the distribution of actions is denoted by ºn ± f¡1 2
M(X) and is de¯ned as follows:
ºn ± f
¡1(B) =
jft 2 Tn : f(t) 2 Bgj
n
(1)
for any Borel set B µ X. Clearly, ºn ± f¡1(B) equals the fraction of players
that play an action in the set B. To each player t, we associate a contin-
uous function Vn(t) : X £ M(X) ! R with the following interpretation:
7Vn(t)(x;¹) is player t's payo® when he plays action x and facing the distrib-
ution ¹. Then, for any strategy f, player t's payo® function is
Un(t)(f) = Vn(t)(f(t);ºn ± f
¡1); (2)
for any strategy f. We denote this class of games by H and we represent a
game Gn 2 H by Gn = ((Tn;ºn);Vn;X).
We let U denote the space of all continuous, real-valued functions on
X £ M(X) with the sup norm. Thus, Vn is a function from Tn to U.
Given a strategy f, x 2 X, and t 2 T, let f nt x denote the strategy
obtained if player t changes his choice from f(t) to x. Formally, f nt x
denotes the strategy g de¯ned by g(t) = x, and g(~ t) = f(~ t), for all ~ t 6= t.




¤ nt x) ¡ " for all x 2 X: (3)
Thus, in an " { equilibrium all players are close to their optimum by choosing
according to f¤. A strategy f¤ is a Nash equilibrium of G if f¤ is an " {
equilibrium of Gn for " = 0.
A game with a continuum of players is described by a Borel probability
measure Ã on U. It can be represented by the distribution induced by a
function from the unit interval, endowed with the Lebesgue measure, into U:
Ã = ¸±V ¡1, where V : [0;1] ! U is measurable and ¸ denotes the Lebesgue
measure. Therefore, we also represent a game with a continuum of players
by G = (([0;1];¸);V;X).
Given a Borel probability measure ¿ on U £ X, we denote by ¿U and
¿X the marginal distributions of ¿ on U and X respectively. The expression
u(x;¿) ¸ u(X;¿) means u(x;¿) ¸ u(x0;¿) for all x0 2 X.
8Given a game Ã and " ¸ 0, a Borel probability measure ¿ on U £ X is
an " { equilibrium distribution for Ã if
1. ¿U = Ã, and
2. ¿(f(u;x) 2 U £ X : u(x;¿X) ¸ u(X;¿X) ¡ "g) = 1:
Roughly, in an " { equilibrium distribution almost all players are within
" of their best replies. An equilibrium distribution is an " { equilibrium
distribution with " = 0.
A Borel probability measure » on X is an " { equilibrium distribution
over actions for Ã if there exists an " { equilibrium distribution ¿ for Ã such
that » = ¿X.
A strategy in a game G = (([0;1];¸);V;X) with a continuum of players
is a measurable function f : [0;1] ! X. For each t 2 [0;1], the payo® of
strategy f is
U(t)(f) = V (t)(f(t);¸ ± f
¡1): (4)
For all " ¸ 0, an " { equilibrium is a strategy f satisfying
U(t)(f
¤) ¸ U(t)(f
¤ nt x) ¡ " (5)
for all x 2 X and almost all t 2 [0;1]
Let C be a ¯nite set and ¹ a probability measure on C. In this case,
we will sometimes write ¹l instead of ¹(flg), whenever l 2 C and also ¹ =
(¹1;:::;¹L), with L = jCj. This notation also suggests that a measure with
a ¯nite support can be thought of as a vector in some Euclidean space. We
will also write jj¹jj = maxl2C j¹lj, i.e., jj¹jj is the sup norm of the vector
9(¹1;:::;¹L). Note that a sequence of measures f¹ng1
n=1 on C converges to ¹
if and only if limn!1 jj¹n ¡ ¹jj = 0.
Let K be a subset of U. We say that K is equicontinuous (or, that the
family K of functions is equicontinuous) if for all ´ > 0 there exists a ± > 0
such that maxf½(¹;¿);d(x;y)g < ± implies
jV (x;¹) ¡ V (y;¿)j < ´
for all V 2 K and for all x;y 2 X and ¹;¿ 2 M(X) (see Rudin (1976,
p. 156)). In our framework, equicontinuity can be interpreted as placing \a
bound on the diversity of payo®s" (see Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997)). For
all ± > 0, let
!V(±) = supfjV (x;¹) ¡ V (y;¿)j : maxfd(x;y);½(¹;¿)g < ±g




Of course, if K is equicontinuous, then lim±!0 !K(±) = 0.
3 A Characterization of Equilibrium Distri-
butions
In this section we characterize equilibrium distributions of some simple games
with a continuum of players. These are games with a ¯nite number of charac-
teristics and actions and with payo® functions selected from an equicontinu-
ous family. Despite all these restrictive assumptions, this result is enough to
10establish the existence of pure strategy approximate equilibria in large ¯nite
games.
Theorem 1 Let X be a ¯nite set, m = jXj and K be an equicontinuous
subset of U. Then, the following holds for all games G = (([0;1];¸);V;X)
with a continuum of players such that V ([0;1]) is a ¯nite subset of K and
for all " ¸ 0:
A distribution » on X is an " { equilibrium distribution over actions of
G if and only if for all games Gn = ((Tn;ºn);Vn;X) with a ¯nite number
of players in which Vn(Tn) is a subset of V ([0;1]) there exists a strategy
fn : Tn ! X such that
1. fn is " + 2!K (mjj¸ ± V ¡1 ¡ ºn ± V ¡1
n jj + (m2 + 1)=n) { equilibrium of
Gn and
2. kºn ± f¡1
n ¡ »k · k¸ ± V ¡1 ¡ ºn ± V ¡1
n k + m
n:
In order to illustrate the idea of Theorem 1, consider the particular case
of a sequence of games fGng with a ¯nite number of players with Vn(Tn) µ
V ([0;1]) and with jj¸±V ¡1¡ºn±V ¡1
n jj converging to zero. In this case, we can,
intuitively, say that the sequence fGng converges to G. If » is an equilibrium
distribution over actions of G, then Theorem 1 guarantees the existence of
an "n { equilibrium fn of Gn satisfying "n ! 0 and jjºn ± f¡1
n ¡ »jj ! 0.
That is, ¯nite games that are close to G have approximate equilibria, with a
degree of approximation close to zero, whose induced distributions are close
to ».
Conversely, the existence of approximate equilibria of games converging to
G, with a vanishing degree of approximation and with induced distributions
11converging to », is enough to show that » is an equilibrium distribution over
actions of G.
The strength of Theorem 1, which is crucial to the asymptotic result, is
that the degree of approximation involved depends only on ", on the equicon-
tinuous family K, on the number of pure strategies m, on the Euclidian dis-
tance between the distributions of characteristics jj¸ ± V ¡1 ¡ ºn ± V ¡1
n jj and
on the number of players n. In particular, it is independent of the particular
games G and Gn that we are considering. So, if " and the set of actions
is ¯xed, and we are considering games G and Gn with the same distribu-
tion of characteristics, then the degree of approximation depends only on n.
This fact is at the core of our asymptotic result: once n is su±ciently large,
equilibria will have nice properties.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let X be a ¯nite set and K be an equicontinuous
subset of U. Let " ¸ 0 and let G = (([0;1];¸);V;X) be a game with a
continuum of players such that V ([0;1]) is a ¯nite subset of K. Let ¯ =
¸ ± V ¡1. Let supp(¯) = fV1;:::;VLg.
(Necessity) Let » be an " { equilibrium distribution over actions of G and
let ¹ be an " { equilibrium distribution of G such that » = ¹X. We can
represent ¹ as follows:







i=1 ¹l;i = ¯l for all 1 · l · L. Since ¹ is an " { equilibrium
distribution, it follows that if ¹l;i > 0 then
Vl(xi;») ¸ Vl(x;») ¡ " (6)
for all x 2 X.
Let Gn be a game with a ¯nite number of players such that Vn(Tn) is a
subset of V ([0;1]). For all 1 · l · L, let Tn;l = ft 2 Tn : Vn(t) = Vlg and
°n;l = jTn;lj. Then, °n = (°n;1;:::;°n;L) is such that °n=n = ºn ± V ¡1
n .
Let 1 · l · L be given. De¯ne
Sl = fei : ¹l;i > 0g;
where E = fe1;:::;emg is the standard basis of Rm. De¯ne St = Sl if t 2 Tn;l.
If °n;l > 0, it follows that, Sl µ 1
°n;l
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Then, for all 1 · i · m, it follows that


























































Thus, by the Shapley-Folkman Theorem (see Rashid (1983, p. 9)), it follows








jft 2 Tn : ®t 62 Stgj · m:
Let 1 · l · L and de¯ne Pn = ft 2 Tn : ®t 2 Eg. De¯ne a strategy fn
as follows: if t 2 Pn, then let ei be such that ®t = ei and de¯ne fn(t) = xi;
if t 2 P c
n := Tn n Pn and Vt = Vl, choose 1 · i · m such that ¹l;i > 0 and
de¯ne fn(t) = xi. By (6), it follows that
Vt(fn(t);») ¸ Vt(x;») ¡ "
for all t 2 Tn and x 2 X.
Let ¾ = ºn ± f¡1
n . We claim that
























Therefore, letting Âf¡1(xi) denote the characteristic function of f¡1(xi), we
obtain that


































and so jj¿ ¡ ¾jj · m=n.
Since ºn ± f¡1 = ¾ and k» ¡ ¿k · k¯ ¡ °n=nk, then kºn ± f¡1 ¡ »k ·
k¯ ¡ °n=nk + m=n. This establishes assertion 2 in the statement of the
Theorem.
By Lemma 1, ½(¿;ºn ± f¡1
n ) · m2=n since ºn ± f¡1
n = ¾. Also, by Lemma
2, it follows that
½(ºn ± f
¡1




for all t 2 Tn and x 2 X. Hence, using (9), it follows that
½(ºn ± f
¡1

































n . Hence, for all t 2 Tn and
x 2 X, we obtain
Vt(fn(t);ºn ± f
¡1
n ) ¸ Vt(fn(t);») ¡ !K(µ)
¸ Vt(x;») ¡ " ¡ !K(µ)
¸ Vt(x;ºn ± (fn nt x)
¡1) ¡ " ¡ 2!K(µ):
(14)
15Therefore, fn is a pure "+2!K(mk¯ ¡°n=nk+(m2 +1)=n) { equilibrium of
Gn.
(Su±ciency) Let » be a distribution over X satisfying the condition. Let
fqng µ QL
+ be such that qn ! ¯. Consider ¯rst the case in which there exists
°n = (°n;1;:::;°n;L) 2 NL such that qn = °n=n, for all n 2 N. De¯ne, for all
n, a game Gn = ((Tn;ºn);Vn;X) where Vn satis¯es jft 2 Tn : Vn(t) = Vlgj =
°n;l for all 1 · l · L.
For all n, let fn satisfy 1 and 2. Consider the sequence fºn ± (Vn;fn)¡1g.
Taking a subsequence if necessary, we may assume that it converges. Let
¹ = limn ºn ± (Vn;fn)¡1. Then, ¹U = ¯ = ¸ ± V ¡1 and ¹X = » since,
respectively, ºn ±V ¡1
n = °n=n and jjºn ±f¡1
n ¡»jj · jj¯ ¡°n=njj+m=n ! 0.















n ) = 0, it follows, by Lemma 5,
that ¹ is an " { equilibrium distribution of G. Thus, » is an " { equilibrium
distribution over action of G.
We turn now to the general case. For all n 2 N, there exists ®n 2 NL
and mn 2 N such that qn = ®n=mn and fmngn is increasing. Consider a
sequence f¾k=kg satisfying ¾k = ®n if k = mn. De¯ning a game Gk as above,
we obtain a strategy fk satisfying 1 and 2, for all k 2 N. Then, we consider
the subsequence fºkj ± (Vkj;fkj)¡1gj, where kj = mj for all j 2 N. Then,
ºkj ± V
¡1
kj converges to ¯, and we can use a similar argument as above.
164 Existence of Pure, Approximate Equilibria
in Large, Equicontinuous Games
In this section we state our asymptotic result. It says that all su±ciently large
games have a pure " { equilibrium, provided that players' payo® functions
are selected from an equicontinuous family.
Theorem 2 Let K be an equicontinuous subset of U. Then, for all " > 0
there exists N 2 N such that n ¸ N and Vn(Tn) µ K implies that Gn 2 H
has a pure " { equilibrium.
Theorem 2 is an approximation result: it guarantees the existence of an
approximate equilibrium in pure strategies if the game is su±ciently large.
Essentially, we are approximating not only pure strategy Nash equilibria, but
also games with a continuum of players, in which the conclusion of Theorem
2 holds exactly. This is how we proceed: we associate, to any su±ciently
large ¯nite game, a game with a continuum of players having the same dis-
tribution of payo® functions. By Mas-Colell's existence theorem, we obtain
an equilibrium distribution. An important lemma (Lemma 4 in Appendix
A.1) then shows that there exists an approximate equilibrium with ¯nite sup-
port. We then restrict players to this ¯nite set of actions, and since the set
of players characteristic is a ¯nite subset of an equicontinuous family, we can
apply Theorem 1 to this approximate equilibrium. In this way, we construct
a pure approximate equilibrium for the original ¯nite game.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let " > 0. Let ± > 0 be such that !K(±) < "=3
and let fx1;:::;xmg µ X be given by Lemma 4 and corresponding to ´ =
17minf"=3;±g. Finally, let N 2 N be such that !K(m2+1
n ) < "=3 and 1=n < ±
for all n ¸ N.
Let Gn be a game in H with n ¸ N. Consider the following game
with a continuum of players: G = (([0;1];¸);V;X) where V (t) = Vn(i) if
t 2 Ti := [i¡1
n ; i
n) for 1 · i · n¡1 and V (t) = Vn(n) if t 2 Tn = [n¡1
n ;1]: Note
that ¸±V ¡1 = ºn±V ¡1
n . Since V ([0;1]) is ¯nite and is a subset of K, it follows
by Lemma 4 that G has "=3 { equilibrium f with f([0;1]) µ fx1;:::;xmg.
By Theorem 1, there exists a "=3+!K((m2+1)=n) { equilibrium fn of the
game ((Tn;ºn);Vn;fx1;:::;xmg). Let t 2 Tn and x 2 X. Then, there exists
xi 2 fx1;:::;xmg such that d(x;xi) < ±. Note that ½(ºn ± (fn nt xi)¡1;ºn ±
(fn nt x)¡1) < 1=n < ±. Hence,
Vt(fn(t);ºn ± f
¡1






















> Vt(x;ºn ± (fn nt x)
¡1) ¡ ":
(15)
Therefore, fn is an " { equilibrium of Gn.
Theorem 2 is clearly related to Mas-Colell's, which states that an equi-
librium exists for all games with a continuum of players.
Theorem 3 (Mas-Colell) An equilibrium distribution exists for all games
¹ 2 M(U).
In fact, our construction shows that Theorem 2 is a consequence of Mas-
Colell's existence theorem. But more is true: as Theorem 4 below shows, the
two results are equivalent. This implies that Theorem 2 is the asymptotic
version of Mas-Colell's existence theorem.
18Theorem 4 Theorem 2 holds if and only if Theorem 3 holds.
The equivalence between the two results means that they are simply two
di®erent ways of expressing the same phenomenon: the existence of pure
strategy Nash equilibria can be addressed either in its exact version in games
with a continuum of players or in an approximate version in large, equicon-
tinuous games. This result clearly stresses the relation between equilibrium
distributions of games with a continuum of players and approximate equilib-
ria of large ¯nite games.
Proof of Theorem 4. Since we have established Theorem 2 using
Theorem 3 (which is essential to Lemma 4), it is enough to show that we can
prove Theorem 3 with Theorem 2.
Let ¹ be a game with a continuum of players. Then, by Parthasarathy
(1967, Theorem II.6.3, p.44), there exists a sequence f¹kg µ M(U) such that
¹k converges to ¹, supp(¹k) is ¯nite and ¹k(fvg) 2 Q for all v 2 supp(¹k).
Let supp(¹k) = fV 1
k ;:::;V
Lk
k g, where V l







Let k 2 N be ¯xed. Then fV l
kg1·l·Lk is an equicontinuous subset of U.
De¯ne the following set of games G°tk = ((T°tk;º°tk);V°tk;X) for all ° 2 N.
That is, G°tk has °tk players, each has X as his choice set and their payo®
functions are de¯ned in the following way: V°tk : T°tk ! U is such that it
associates V l
k to °¯l
k players, for all 1 · l · Lk.
By Theorem 2, G°ktk has a 1=k { equilibrium f°ktk : T°ktk ! X if °k is
su±ciently large. Let ¿k = º°ktk ± (V°ktk;f°ktk)¡1 2 M(U £ X). We may
assume that °ktk > k, by choosing °k large enough.
19Since ¿U;k converges to ¹, it follows that f¹;¿U;1;¿U;2;:::g, and so f¿U;kgk
is tight by Hildenbrand (1974, Theorem 32 and 33, p. 49 and 50). Also,
since M(X) is compact, then f¿X;1;¿X;2;:::g is tight by Hildenbrand (1974,
Theorem 34, p. 50). Thus, f¿kgk is tight (Hildenbrand (1974, Theorem 35,
p. 50)) and, taking a subsequence if necessary, we may assume that f¿kg
converges (Hildenbrand (1974, Theorem 31, p. 49)). Let ¿ = limk ¿k. Then,
by Lemma 5 it follows that ¿ is an equilibrium distribution of ¿U = ¹.
Another aspect that stresses the asymptotic nature of Theorem 2 is that
it requires a class of payo® functions for which an equilibrium is sure to
exist whenever the game has a continuum of players. In particular, it is
false for games in which players have general payo® functions. As a simple
example, consider " = 1=4, and the following games Gn with X = fH;Tg
and n ¸ 2: players 1 and 2 play the matching pennies (see Table 1), while
the remaining players are indi®erent between all strategies (i.e., Un(t)(f) = 0




Table 1: Payo® Function for the Matching Pennies
Then, if f is a pure strategy, it follows that at least one of players 1 and
2 is not 1/4 { optimizing. This implies that f cannot be a 1=4 { equilibrium.
Therefore, Gn has no pure, 1=4 { equilibrium for all n ¸ 2.
205 Games based on the Averages of Individual
Choices
Khan and Sun (1999) also consider the case in which the action space is
endowed with a linear structure and each player's payo® depends only on his
choice and on the average of players' choices. In this section, we establish
an existence result for this case, as well. In particular, we show that an
approximate equilibrium exists in all equicontinuous, and su±ciently large
games if
1. the action space is a weakly compact subset of a separable Banach
space and the average is a Bochner integral,
2. the action space is a norm compact subset of a Banach space and the
average is again a Bochner integral,
3. the action space is a weak* compact subset of the dual of a separable
Banach space and the average is a Gel'fand integral and
4. the action space is a denumerable subset of R1.
We emphasize that these results are obtained as corollaries of Theorem
2. Although a direct argument is possible, this highlights the additional
generality of considering games in which each player's payo® depends on
the distribution of players' choices when compared with games in which it
depends only on the average of players' choices.
215.1 Bochner Integral with the Weak Topology
In this subsection, assume that X is a weakly compact subset of a separable
Banach space B. Let co(X) denote the closed convex hull of X, which is also
weakly compact (see Diestel and Uhl (1977, Theorem 11, p. 51)). It follows
from Dunford and Schwartz (1957, Theorem V.6.3, p. 434) that both X
and co(X) are metrizable. Finally, let Uw be the space of weakly continuous
real-valued functions on X £ co(X) endowed with the sup norm.
If f : Tn ! X is a pure strategy in a game with n players, let
R
Tn fdºn









In this case, we associate to each player t a weakly continuous function Vn(t) :









for any strategy f : Tn ! X. We denote this class of games by Hw.
Corollary 1 Let K be an equicontinuous subset of Uw. Then, for all " > 0
there exists N 2 N such that n ¸ N and Vn(Tn) µ K implies that Gn 2 Hw
has a pure " { equilibrium.
5.2 Bochner Integral with the Norm Topology
In this subsection, assume that X is a norm compact of a Banach space B.
Then, co(X) is also norm compact (see Diestel and Uhl (1977, Theorem 12,
p. 51)). We let Unorm be the space of norm continuous real-valued functions
on X £ co(X) endowed with the sup norm.
22Finally, we let Hnorm be the class of games de¯ned as in Subsection 5.1,
except that now players' payo® functions belong to Unorm (and X is norm
compact).
As in Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997), Corollary 1 also applies to the case of
norm compact action spaces. Note that X is weakly compact. Thus, since
norm continuous functions on norm compact sets are weakly continuous, we
obtain the following existence result.
Corollary 2 Let K be an equicontinuous subset of Unorm. Then, for all
" > 0 there exists N 2 N such that n ¸ N and Vn(Tn) µ K implies that
Gn 2 Hnorm has a pure " { equilibrium.
5.3 Gel'fand Integral
In this subsection, let B¤ be the dual of a separable Banach space B and
assume that X is a weak* compact subset of B¤. Then, co(X) is also weak*
compact. It follows from Rudin (1971, Theorem 3.16, p. 70) that both X
and co(X) are metrizable. Finally, let Ug be the space of weak* continuous
real-valued functions on X £ co(X) endowed with the sup norm.
If f : Tn ! X is a pure strategy in a game with n players, let
R
Tn fdºn









We associate to each player t a weak* continuous function Vn(t) : X £









23for any strategy f : Tn ! X. We denote this class of games by Hg.
Corollary 3 Let K be an equicontinuous subset of Ug. Then, for all " > 0
there exists N 2 N such that n ¸ N and Vn(Tn) µ K implies that Gn 2 Hg
has a pure " { equilibrium.
5.4 Games with Denumerably Many Actions in R1
In this subsection, we consider the class of games de¯ned in Section 5 of
Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997). Let R1 be the space of all real sequences
equipped with the product topology. The standard basis vectors are denoted
by feig1
i=1. We let the space of actions be X = feig1
i=0 with e0 ´ 0. Again,
co(X) denotes the closed convex hull of X, which is equal to the set of all
sequences of real numbers chosen from the closed unit interval. Finally, let
U1 be the space of continuous real-valued functions on X £ co(X) endowed
with the sup norm.
The following de¯nitions are from Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997). If (T;T ;º)
is a probability space, then a function f : T ! R1 is measurable if f¡1(feig) 2











i=1 ei¹(feig) and so we trivially








Furthermore, if j 2 N and ¼j : R1 ! R is the projection onto the jth













In this case, we associate to each player t a continuous function Vn(t) :









for any strategy f. We denote this class of games by H1.
Corollary 4 Let K be an equicontinuous subset of U1. Then, for all " > 0
there exists N 2 N such that n ¸ N and Vn(Tn) µ K implies that Gn 2 H1
has a pure " { equilibrium.
6 Mixed Strategies
In this section, we allow players to choose mixed strategies. In this context,
a mixed strategy for a player is a Borel probability measure on the set of his
pure strategies. Thus, a mixed strategy is a function f : Tn ! M(X), while
a pure strategy is a function g : Tn ! X. Note that a pure strategy can
be seen as a mixed strategy, simply by associating X with the degenerate
probability measures on X.
Given a strategy f in a game with n players, the distribution of players'
choices is ºn ± f¡1, now an element of M(M(X)). Consequently, players'
payo® functions are elements of Um, which we use to denote the space of all
continuous, real valued functions on X £ M(M(X)).
25As in Section 2, we associate to each player a function Vn(t) : X £
M(M(X)) ! R with the following interpretation: Vn(t)(x;¹) is player t's
payo® when he plays action x and facing the distribution ¹. Then, for any






We let Hm denote this class of games.
Since M(X) is (homeomorphic to) a closed subset of M(M(X)), then
each game Gn in which mixed strategies are allowed induces a game ~ Gn in H
simply by restricting players' payo® functions to X £ M(X). Furthermore,
if K µ Um is equicontinuous, then ~ K µ U de¯ned by restricting the domain
in this way is also equicontinuous. Thus, for all K µ Um and all " > 0, if n is
su±ciently large, then ~ Gn has a pure strategy "=3 { equilibrium f : Tn ! X.
It is easy to see that f is also an " { equilibrium of Gn since for every t 2 Tn












Vn(t)(x;ºn ± (f nt ~ ft)
¡1)d ~ ft(x) ¡ ":
(21)
Note that both inequalities hold since Vn(Tn) is a subset of an equicontinuous
family in Um and if n is su±ciently large to imply that the change from
ºn ± (f nt x)¡1 to ºn ± f¡1 and from ºn ± f¡1 to ºn ± (f nt ~ ft)¡1, respectively,
produces at most a change of "=3 in players' payo®s. Thus, we obtain the
following existence result.
Theorem 5 Let K be an equicontinuous subset of Um. Then, for all " > 0
there exists N 2 N such that n ¸ N and Vn(Tn) µ K imply that Gn 2 Hm
has a pure " { equilibrium.
26An interesting question that arises once we consider mixed strategy is if
all Nash equilibria can be approximately puri¯ed. In Carmona (2005a), we
show that the answer is no.
7 On the Need for Equicontinuity
In this section, we show that in general, we cannot obtain a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium even in equicontinuous large games. The exact version of
Theorem 2 (i.e., with " = 0) therefore holds only in the limit case of games
with a continuum of players. As an easy consequence, we also show that it is
not possible to dispense with the equicontinuity assumption used in Theorem
2.
The idea of the example is simple: each player has two actions, zero or
one, to choose from. Player 1 wants to mismatch the average (if everyone
else chooses 1, he prefers 0, and vice versa), while player 2 wants to match.
For half of the remaining players, 0 is the dominant strategy, while 1 is the
dominant strategy for the other half. This last condition forces the average
to close to 1/2 and pins down the behavior of all the players, except for
players 1 and 2. At this point, we are in a matching pennies situation: if
a strategy prescribes di®erent actions for them, then player 2 would like to
deviate to match player 1's choice; if a strategy prescribes the same action
for both of them, then player 1 would like to deviate to mismatch player 2's
choice. Hence, no pure equilibrium can exist.
Here are the details. Let n ¸ 4 be even. Let Tn = f1;:::;ng be par-
titioned into four sets: Tn;1 = f1g, Tn;2 = f2g, Tn;3 and Tn;4 satisfying
27jTn;3j = jTn;4j = n=2 ¡ 1.
Let X = f0;1g. Let i : X ! X be the identity function, ºn be the
uniform measure on Tn and ¹ 2 M(X).
















10 if x = 1
0 if x = 0:
(23)
and W4 = ¡W3. For a player t 2 T3, let Vn(t) = W3, while for a player t 2 T4
let Vn(t) = W4.
Let Gn be as de¯ned above whenever n ¸ 4 is even. In the other case,
de¯ne Gn by setting Vn(t) = V3 for all t 2 Tn.










We claim that if n ¸ 4 is even, then Gn has no pure strategy Nash equilib-






1 if t 2 T3
0 if t 2 T4:
(24)
Regarding f(1) and f(2), we consider the four possible cases.





























Vn(2)(1;ºn ± (f n2 1)




















n: Therefore, Vn(2)(0;ºn ± (f n2 0)¡1) ¡ Vn(2)(f(2);ºn ±
f¡1) = ®n
n = 1
n > 0; a contradiction.














2: Therefore, Vn(1)(1;ºn ± (f n1 1)¡1) ¡ Vn(1)(f(1);ºn ±
f¡1) = ®n
n = 1
n > 0; a contradiction.













2: Therefore, Vn(1)(0;ºn ±(f n1 0)¡1)¡
Vn(1)(f(1);ºn ± f¡1) = ®n
n = 1
n > 0; a contradiction. This proves the claim.
Note that the family of payo® functions used, which equals
fV1(1);V1(2);W3;W4g;
is equicontinuous. But, despite this, we cannot guarantee the existence of a
pure strategy Nash equilibrium, even if n is large.
This example can be easily modi¯ed to show that the conclusion of Theo-
rem 2 fails, if we drop the equicontinuity assumption. Simply de¯ne ®n = 2n,
for all n 2 N. Similarly to what we have done above, we can show that, if
29n ¸ 4 is even, then Gn has no pure 1 { equilibrium.2






Since limn!1 ®n = 1; it follows that it is not equicontinuous. This accounts
for the failure of the conclusion of Theorem 2.
8 Relation with Khan and Sun (1999)
Khan and Sun (1999) stated an asymptotic existence theorem for large games
based on non-standard methods. For the class of games we consider here,
they state the following result: Let fGng1
n=1 µ H be a tight sequence of
games (i.e., the sequence fºn ± V ¡1
n g1
n=1 µ M(U) is tight). Then, for all
" > 0 there exists N 2 N such that for all n ¸ N there exists f : Tn ! X
such that for all t 2 Tn and all x 2 X,
Vn(t)(f(t);ºn ± f
¡1) ¸ Vn(t)(x;ºn ± f
¡1) ¡ ": (26)
However, we can modify the example presented in Section 7 to show that
this statement is false.3
2Again, we assume that a 1 { equilibrium exists. Then, players in T3 must play 1 and
players in T4 must play 0. We then consider the four possible case for players 1 and 2.
The above formulas show that there is at least one player whose gain from deviation is
®n=n = 2 > 1, which is a contradiction.
3The reason we need to modify the example is that our equilibrium notion is di®erent
than theirs. Theirs assumes that a player's deviation does not a®ect the distribution of
actions. Note that the family of payo® functions used in our second example in Section 7
(i.e., when ®n = 2n) is tight, and so it also shows that the above conclusion fails for our
equilibrium concept.
30The di±culty with the statement in Khan and Sun (1999) is that there is
a small fraction of players whose payo® function might be extremely sensitive
to small changes in the distribution of choices. Thus, we cannot guarantee
that those players are almost optimizing.
This suggests that their result is valid if we de¯ne approximate equilibria
by requiring that a large fraction of players is almost optimizing. Formally,
for all ";´ ¸ 0, a strategy f is an (";´) { equilibrium of Gn if
jft 2 Tn : Un(t)(f) ¸ Un(t)(f nt x) ¡ " for all x 2 Xgj
n
¸ 1 ¡ ´: (27)
Regarding this notion, we obtain the following existence result.4
Theorem 6 Let ¡ µ H be a tight family of games. Then, for all " > 0 and
´ > 0 there exists N 2 N such that n ¸ N and implies that Gn 2 ¡ has a
pure (";´) { equilibrium.
This is the correct statement of Kahn and Sun's result, which was also
pointed out by Sun (2005). This result is, however, equivalent to our Theorem
2.5
Theorem 7 Theorem 2 holds if and only if Theorem 6 holds.
Of course, this implies that Kahn and Sun's theorem is also equivalent
to Mas-Colell's. In fact, this is how we prove the above result: it is easier to
compare both our Theorem 2 and Kahn and Sun's with Mas-Colell's than to
compare them directly. As is typically the case, non-atomic games are easier
to study and are, therefore, useful even when one is only interested in large
¯nite games.
4Its proof is a simple variation of that of Theorem 2 and is presented in Appendix A.4.
5Its proof is a simple variation of that of Theorem 4 and is presented in Appendix A.5.
319 Concluding Remarks
The main objective of this paper is to argue for Mas-Colell's formalization
of the equilibrium theory of large games in terms of distributions. We follow
his approach and show that:
1. for any equicontinuous family of payo® functions and any " > 0, all
su±ciently large games have a pure " { equilibrium;
2. the above asymptotic result is equivalent to Mas-Colell's and
3. it is also equivalent to Khan and Sun's.
Therefore, we can construct an equilibrium theory of large ¯nite games using
Mas-Colell's model, which is as rich as the one developed by Kahn and Sun
(and as rich as the theory obtained by Mas-Colell for games with a continuum
of players). To put it di®erently, the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria
in games with a continuum of players can be studied equivalently to the
existence of pure approximate equilibria in large, equicontinuous games.
These results provide an additional example of the type of results showing
that approximate equilibria of ¯nite games have the same, or approximately
the same, properties as equilibria of continuum games. In this way, it stresses
the close relationship between equilibria of games with a continuum of players
and approximate equilibria of games with a ¯nite number of players.
32A Appendix
A.1 Lemmata
In this appendix, we prove several results needed for our main results. Lemma
1 deals with measures with a ¯nite support, which can be thought of as a
vector in some Euclidean space. Roughly, Lemma 1 says that the Prohorov
distance between two measures whose support is contained in some ¯nite set
is proportional to their Euclidean distance.
Lemma 1 Let ¿;¹ 2 M(X) be such that supp(¿) [ supp(¹) µ ª, where ª
is a ¯nite set. If there exists " > 0 such that j¿l ¡¹lj · " for all 1 · l · jªj,
then ½(¿;¹) · jªj".







(¹l + ") ·
X
l2ª\B
¹l + jªj" ·
¹(Bjªj"(B)) + jªj":
(28)
Similarly, we can show that ¹(B) · ¿(Bjªj"(B)) + jªj": This implies that
½(¿;¹) · jªj".
Lemma 2 shows that in large games, deviations by a small fraction of
players have a small impact on the distribution of actions.
Lemma 2 Let Gn 2 H be a game and let f and g be strategies. If






¡1) · °: (30)
Proof. Let ¹ = ºn ± f¡1 and ¿ = ºn ± g¡1. Let B µ X be Borel
measurable. Then,
¿(B) =
jft : g(t) 2 Bgj
n
·
jft : f(t) 2 Bgj
n
+









Similarly, we can show that ¹(B) · ¿(B°(B))+°: This implies that ½(¿;¹) ·
°.
In particular, we have that ½(ºn±f¡1;ºn±(fntx)¡1) · 1=n for all strategies
f, players t 2 Tn and actions x 2 X.
Lemma 3 establishes the existence of an approximate equilibrium distri-
bution with ¯nite support for games with ¯nitely many characteristics.
Lemma 3 Suppose that ¹ 2 M(U) has ¯nite support and let ¿ be an equi-
librium distribution of ¹. Then, there exists a sequence f¿kg1
k=1 µ M(U£X)
such that
1. ¿k converges to ¿,
2. ¿U;k = ¹ for all k,
3. ¿X;k has ¯nite support for all k,
4. supp(¿k) µ supp(¿) for all k and
345. for all " > 0, there exists K 2 N such that
¿k (f(u;x) : u(x;¿X;k) ¸ u(X;¿X;k) ¡ "g) = 1;
for all k ¸ K.
Proof. Let supp(¹) = fu1;:::;ung. Letting Di = fx 2 X : (ui;x) 2
supp(¿)g for all 1 · i · n, the fact that ¿U = ¹ readily implies that
supp(¿) = [n
i=1(fuig £ Di). This follows because supp(¿) µ [n
i=1(fuig £ X)
since [n
i=1(fuig £ X) is closed and ¿([n
i=1(fuig £ X)) =
Pn
i=1 ¿U(fuig) = 1.
For all 1 · i · n, de¯ne ci = ¹(fuig) and
¿i(B) = ¿(fuig £ B)=ci
for all Borel subsets B of X. For latter use, we claim that
supp(¿) = [
n
i=1 (fuig £ supp(¿i)):
Since [n
i=1 (fuig £ supp(¿i)) is closed and
¿ ([
n
i=1 (fuig £ supp(¿i))) =
X
i




it follows that supp(¿) µ [n
i=1 (fuig £ supp(¿i)). Conversely, recall that
supp(¿) = [n
i=1fuig £ Di. Since supp(¿) is closed, one easily sees that Di is
closed. Furthermore,
Pn
i=1 ¿(fuig£Di) = ¿(supp(¿)) = 1 and ¿(fuig£Di) ·
¿(fuig£X) = ci imply that ¿(fuig£Di) = ci, that is, ¿i(Di) = 1. Therefore,
supp(¿i) µ Di and so, fuig£supp(¿i) µ fuig£Di. Finally, one obtains that
[n
i=1 (fuig £ supp(¿i)) µ [n
i=1 (fuig £ Di) = supp(¿).
The measure ¿i can be thought of as a measure in supp(¿i), a closed
(and therefore, compact) subset of X. Then, there exists a sequence f¿i;kgk
35such that supp(¿i;k) is a ¯nite subset of supp(¿i) and ¿i;k converges to ¿i in
supp(¿i). Since supp(¿i) is closed in X, then, by Lemma 6, we have that ¿i;k
converges to ¿i in X.
Let C be a Borel measurable subset of U £ X. Then, let Bi = fx 2 X :





Note that ¿U;k(fuig) = ci for all 1 · i · n and so ¿U;k = ¹ for all k.
Also, it is clear that ¿X;k has ¯nite support for all k. Furthermore, since




i=1 (fuig £ supp(¿i;k)):
This immediatly implies that supp(¿k) µ supp(¿) for all k, since supp(¿i;k) µ
supp(¿i).
We claim that ¿k converges to ¿. This follows since, if h : U £ X ! R is
continuous and bounded, then x 7! h(ui;x) is also continuous and bounded























We ¯nally establish property 5. For convenience, for all ´ ¸ 0 and ¾ 2
M(U £ X), let B´
¾ = f(u;x) 2 U £ X : u(x;¾X) ¸ u(X;¾X) ¡ ´g, and
B¾ = B0
¾ if ´ = 0. Let " > 0. Since B¿ is closed and ¿(B¿) = 1, then
supp(¿) µ B¿. Hence, supp(¿k) µ B¿ for all k.
36Let ± > 0 be such that maxfd(x;y);½(¹;º)g < ± implies that ju(x;¹) ¡
u(y;º)j < "=2 for all u 2 fu1;:::;ung.
Let K 2 N be such that ½(¿X;k;¿X) < ± for all k ¸ K. Then, supp(¿k) \
B¿ µ supp(¿k) \ B"
¿k, since if (u;x) 2 supp(¿k) \ B¿ and y 2 X then




¿k) = ¿k(supp(¿k) \ B
"
¿k) ¸ ¿k(supp(¿k) \ B¿) = ¿k(supp(¿k)) = 1: (32)
This concludes the proof.
Lemma 4 strengthens the conclusion of Lemma 3, whenever the set of
players' characteristics is a ¯nite subset of an equicontinuous family. It guar-
antees the existence of a ¯nite set of actions with the property that all the
above games have an approximate equilibrium strategy taking values in this
¯nite set. The strength of this result is that the ¯nite set works uniformly
for all such games, i.e., it depends only on the equicontinuous set and on the
degree of approximation desired.
Lemma 4 Let K be an equicontinuous subset of U. Then, for all ´ > 0,
there exists fx1;:::;xmg µ X such that the following holds:
1. X = [m
i=1B´(xi) and
2. if G = (([0;1];¸);V;X) is such that V ([0;1]) is ¯nite, then there exists
a strategy g such that g([0;1]) µ fx1;:::;xmg and
V (t)(g(t);¸ ± g
¡1) > V (t)(X;¸ ± g
¡1) ¡ ´
for all t 2 V ¡1(K):
37Consequently, if V ([0;1]) is a subset of K, then g is an ´ { equilibrium.
Proof. Let ´ > 0. Since K is equicontinuous, there exists ± > 0 such
that maxfd(x;y);½(¹;º)g < ± implies that ju(x;¹) ¡ u(y;º)j < ´=3 for all
x;y 2 X, ¹;º 2 M(X) and u 2 K. We can choose ± < ´.
Let fx1;:::;xmg be such that X = [m
j=1B±=2(xj). De¯ne B1 = B±=2(x1)






, 2 · j · m.
Let G be such that V ([0;1]) is a ¯nite subset of U. By Mas-Colell Theo-
rem, G has an equilibrium distribution. It follows from Lemma 3 that G has
an ´=3 { equilibrium distribution with ¯nite support and so a pure strategy
´=3 { equilibrium f (this follows easily from Liaponov's Theorem (see Rudin
(1971, Theorem 5.5, p. 120))).
De¯ne g : [0;1] ! fx1;:::;xmg by g(t) = xj if f(t) 2 Bj. Then, clearly
jf(t) ¡ g(t)j < ±=2. This implies that
ft 2 [0;1] : g(t) 2 Dg µ ft 2 [0;1] : f(t) 2 B±=2(D)g
for all Borel measurable subsets D of X and so
¸ ± g
¡1(D) · ¸ ± f
¡1(B±=2(D)) + ±=2:




This implies that for all t 2 V ¡1(K) and all x 2 X,
V (t)(g(t);¸ ± g








> V (t)(x;¸ ± g
¡1) ¡ ´:
(33)
38In particular, if V ([0;1]) µ K, then g is an ´ { equilibrium of G.
Lemma 5 is used to draw conclusions for games with a continuum of
players from properties of large ¯nite games. It uses the de¯nition of (";´)
{ equilibrium, given in Section 8. Furthermore, it considers a more general
case in which a game Gn = ((Tn;ºn);Vn;X) with ¯nitely many players has
jTnj players (not necessarily equal to n), and ºn is the uniform measure on
Tn.
Lemma 5 Let G = (([0;1];¸);V;X) be a game with a continuum of players,
¿ be a distribution on U £X satisfying ¿U = ¸±V ¡1 and " ¸ 0. Suppose that
fGng1
n=1 is a sequence of games with a ¯nite number of players and ffng1
n=1
is a sequence of strategies satisfying:
1. jTnj ! 1;
2. fn is an ("n;´n) { equilibrium of Gn,
3. "n ¸ ", "n ! ",
4. ´n ¸ 0, ´n ! 0 and
5. ºn ± (Vn;fn)¡1 converges to ¿,
then ¿ is an " { equilibrium distribution of G.
Lemma 5 is slightly more general than the su±ciency part of Theorem 1
in Carmona (2004). We include its proof for the sake of completeness.
Proof. Let ¿n = ºn±(Vn;fn)¡1. For all x 2 supp(¿n;X) and y 2 X, de¯ne
¿
x;y
n;X as follows: ¿
x;y
n;X(x) = ¿n;X(x) ¡ 1=jTnj, ¿
x;y
n;X(y) = ¿n;X(y) + 1=jTnj and
¿
x;y
n;X(¹ x) = ¿n;X(¹ x) for all ¹ x in the support of ¿n;X that are di®erent from x and
39from y. Let B"n
¿n = f(u;x) 2 supp(¿n) : u(x;¿n;X) ¸ u(y;¿
x;y
n;X)¡"n for all y 2
Xg. Also, let B"
¿ = f(u;x) 2 U £ X : u(x;¿X) ¸ u(X;¿X) ¡ "g.
Since ¿n converges to ¿, then ¿X;n converges to ¿X. Taking a subsequence
if necessary, we can assume that jTnj % 1, ½(¿X;¿X;n) & 0, "n & " and
´n & 0. Let µn = ½(¿X;¿X;n) + 2=jTnj; clearly, µn & 0. Since, for all
x 2 supp(¿n;X) and y 2 X,
½(¿X;¿
x;y








it follows that ½(¿X;¿
x;y
n;X) < µn.
De¯ne, for each u 2 U,
¯n(u) = sup
x2X;º2M(X)
fju(x;º) ¡ u(x;¿X)j : ½(º;¿X) < µng:
Since u is continuous on X £ M(X), which is compact, it follows that u is
uniformly continuous. Thus, ¯n(u) & 0 as n ! 1. We claim that ¯n is
continuous in U.
Let ´ > 0. De¯ne ± < ´=2. Then if jju ¡ vjj = supy2X;Á2M(X) ju(y;Á) ¡
v(y;Á)j < ±, we have for any x 2 X, and º 2 M(X) such that ½(º;¿X) < µn
jv(x;º) ¡ v(x;¿X)j · jv(x;º) ¡ u(x;º)j + ju(x;º) + u(x;¿X)j+
+ jv(x;¿X) ¡ u(x;¿X)j < ± + ¯n(u) + ±;
(35)
and so ¯n(v) · 2± + ¯n(u) < ´ + ¯n(u). By symmetry, ¯n(u) < ´ + ¯n(v),
and so j¯n(u) ¡ ¯n(v)j < ´. Hence, ¯n is continuous, as claimed.
Given the de¯nition of ¯n, we have that B"n
¿n µ Dn := f(u;x) 2 U £ X :
u(x;¿X) ¸ u(X;¿X) ¡ "n ¡ 2¯n(u)g. Since ¯n is continuous, we see that Dn
is closed, and so Borel measurable. Thus, ¿n(Dn) ¸ 1 ¡ ´n. Also, Dn & B"
¿.
40Let n 2 N be given. Then, if k ¸ n, it follows that ¿k(Dn) ¸ ¿k(Dk) ¸ 1¡
´k ¸ 1¡´n, and so ¿(Dn) ¸ limsupj ¿j(Dn) ¸ 1¡´n by Parthasarathy (1967,
II.6.1(c)). Hence, ¿(B"
¿) = limn ¿(Dn) = 1. Therefore, ¿ is an equilibrium
distribution of G.
The following lemma shows that the convergence of a sequence of mea-
sures can be studied with respect to any closed set containing both their
support and the support of the limit measure.
Lemma 6 Let X be a metric space and ¹;¹n 2 M(X) for all n 2 N. Let C
be a closed subset of X satisfying supp(¹n);supp(¹) µ C. Then, ¹n ) ¹ in
C if and only if ¹n ) ¹ in X.
Proof. (Necessity) Let h : X ! R be bounded and continuous. Then



















It follows that ¹n ) ¹ in X.
(Su±ciency) Let h : C ! R be bounded and continuous. Then by the
Tietze-Urysohn extension theorem, there exists a bounded, continuous func-




























C hd¹: It follows that ¹n ) ¹ in C.
A.2 Proof of Corollaries 1, 3 and 4
The proof of each corollary follows the same idea. Hence, we will present it
only for the case of Corollary 1.
Let " > 0. Let V 2 K and i : X ! X denote the identity function in X.








for all x 2 X and ¹ 2 M(X).
Note that i is Bochner integrable and
R
X id¹ 2 co(X) for all ¹ 2 M(X).
Furthermore, if ¹k converges to ¹, then
R
X id¹k converges weakly to
R
X id¹
and so v is continuous.
Let g : X £ M(X) ! X £ co(X) be de¯ned by g(x;¹) = (x;
R
X id¹). In
order to apply Theorem 2, it remains to show that ~ K de¯ned by fu 2 U :
u = v ± g for some v 2 Kg is equicontinuous.
Let d denote the metric in co(X). Let " > 0 and let ± > 0 be such that
jv(x;z) ¡ v(y;w)j < " whenever maxfd(x;y);d(z;w)g < ± and v 2 K.





X id¿) < ±.
Suppose, in order to reach a contradiction, that such ´ > 0 does not exist.





X id¿k) ¸ ±. Since M(X) is compact, we may assume that there




X id¿k converge weakly to
R





0, which is a contradiction.
Thus, ~ K is an equicontinuous subset of U. By Theorem 2, let N 2 N be
such that n ¸ N implies that all games ~ Gn 2 H with ~ V (Tn) µ ~ K have an "
{ equilibrium.
Let n ¸ N and Gn 2 Hw be such that V (Tn) µ K. De¯ne ~ Gn 2 H by
letting ~ Vt = Vt ± g. Then, ~ V (Tn) µ ~ K and so there exists an " { equilibrium
f : Tn ! X. Thus,
~ Vt(f(t);ºn ± f
¡1) ¸ ~ V (x;ºn ± (f nt x)
¡1) ¡ "
for all t 2 Tn and x 2 X.
Note that
~ Vt(f(t);ºn ± f




























































and so f is an " { equilibrium of Gn.
43A.3 Example for Section 8
Let n ¸ 4 be even. Let Tn = f1;:::;ng be partitioned into four sets: Tn;1 =
f1g, Tn;2 = f2g, Tn;3 and Tn;4 satisfying jTn;3j = jTn;4j = n=2 ¡ 1.
Let X = f0;1g. Let i : X ! X be the identity function, ºn be the
uniform measure on Tn and ¹ 2 M(X).
Let ° > 1,
1
1 + 2=n





¯n + 2¯n=n ¡ 1
;
2






Clearly, ®n > 0. In fact, ®n ! 1 since ¯n ! 1.

































10 if x = 1
0 if x = 0:
(40)
and W4 = ¡W3. For a player t 2 T3, let Vn(t) = W3, while for a player t 2 T4
let Vn(t) = W4.
Let Gn be as de¯ned above whenever n ¸ 4 is even. In the other case,
de¯ne Gn by setting Vn(t) = W3 for all t 2 Tn. Clearly, the sequence fGng1
n=1






We have that ºn ± V ¡1
n (K) ¸ 1 ¡ 1=n > 1 ¡ " for all n 2 N.
We claim that if n ¸ 4 is even, then there is no f : Tn ! X such that,
for all t 2 Tn and x 2 X,
Vn(t)(f(t);ºn ± f
¡1) ¸ Vn(t)(x;ºn ± f
¡1) ¡ 1 (41)
We prove the above claim by contradiction. Let f be a 1 { equilibrium.
Then, it follows that f(t) = 1 for all t 2 T3 and f(t) = 0 for all t 2 T4.
Regarding f(1) and f(2), we consider the four possible cases.






Therefore, Vn(2)(1;ºn ± f¡1) ¡ Vn(2)(f(2);ºn ± f¡1) = 2
°¡1(° ¡ 1) = 2 > 1; a
contradiction.






Vn(1)(1;ºn±f¡1)¡Vn(1)(f(1);ºn±f¡1) = ®n(1¡¯n) ¸ 2 > 1; a contradiction.









Therefore, Vn(1)(1;ºn ±f¡1)¡Vn(1)(f(1);ºn ±f¡1) = ®n(1¡¯n +2¯n=n) ¸
2 > 1; a contradiction.








n: Therefore, Vn(1)(0;ºn ± f¡1) ¡ Vn(1)(f(1);ºn ± f¡1) =
®n(¯n + 2¯n=n ¡ 1) ¸ 2 > 1; a contradiction. This proves the claim.






is not equicontinuous. This is due to the fact that limn!1 ®n = 1:
45A.4 Proof of Theorem 6
Theorem 6 can be proven using the same scheme used to prove Theorem 2.
Let " > 0 and ´ > 0. Let K be such that ºn ± V ¡1
n (K) > 1 ¡ ´ for all
Gn 2 ¡. Then, let fx1;:::;xmg be given by Lemma 4. Following the proof
of Theorem 2, we can show that
Vn(t)(f(t);ºn ± f
¡1) ¸ Vn(t)(x;ºn ± (f nt x)
¡1) ¡ "
for all x 2 X and all t 2 V ¡1
n (K). Since, ºn ±V ¡1
n (K) > 1¡´ for all Gn 2 ¡,
the result follows.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 7
It is enough to show that Theorem 6 implies Theorem 3. We can use the
same argument used in the proof of Theorem 4, except that f°ktk is only a
(1=k;1=k) { equilibrium of G°ktk. However, Lemma 5 still applies and the
conclusion follows.
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